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Ireland's Abortion Information Act of
1995
ABSTRACT

On May 12, 1995, the Supreme Court of Ireland upheld
an act making it legal to disseminate information concerning
abortion services abroad, provided that the information does
not advocate or promote the termination of the pregnancy.
While the Abortion InformationAct of 1995 is likely to make it
easierfor an Irish woman to obtain an abortion overseas, it
does not change the circumstances under which a woman
may obtain an abortion in Ireland. Under the Eighth
Amendment to the Irish Constitution, as interpreted by the
Irish Supreme Court, abortion is illegal except where the
pregnancy poses a substantialrisk to the life of the mother.
Given the pervasive Influence of the Catholic Church in
Ireland,pro-choice activists are unlikely to bring aboutfurther
liberalization of Ireland's abortion law using the domestic
political process. It is possible, however, that the European
Courtof Human Rights wlllfind that the privacy clause in the
European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to
have an abortion. If this were to occur, Ireland, as a signator
to the Convention, would be obligated to change its abortion
law to conform with the Court'sdecision.
This note offers an overview of Irish abortion law after
the passage of the Abortion Information Act and Identifies
several issues left unresolved by the act that are likely to be
the source of controversy in the future. It also examines the
merits of a claim that Ireland's strictabortion law violates the
EuropeanConvention on Human Rights and explores the legal
precedent that the European Court of Human Rights is likely
to rely on in deciding this question.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On May 12, 1995, the Supreme Court of Ireland upheld an
act' making it legal, under specified conditions, to disseminate
information concerning abortion services available abroad. 2 The
Court's decision warrants attention because the Irish Constitution
has explicitly recognized the right to life of the unborn since the
The Irish
enactment of the Eighth Amendment 3 in 1983.

1.
For purposes of this note, this author refers to the act as the Abortion
Information Act of 1995. The full name of the Act is, "An act to prescribe the
conditions subject to which certain information regarding services lawfully
available outside the state for the termination of pregnancies and persons who
provide such services may be given to individual women or the general public,
amending the Indecent Advertisements Act of 1889 and the Censorship
Publications Act 1929 to 1967[," (1995) (Ir.).
In the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and in the Matter of the
2.
Reference to the Court of The Regulation of Information (Services Outside the
State for Termination of Pregnancies) Bill 1995, [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 81 (Ir. S.C.)
[hereinafter In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act].
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Supreme Court historically had construed the distribution of
abortion information as a violation of that right.
This note explores the constitutional dimensions of the
Ireland Supreme Court's decision upholding the Abortion
Information Act of 1995 (hereinafter 1995 Act) and evaluates the
law's likely effect upon society. Section II examines the forces
that led to the enactment of the Eighth Amendment and analyzes
the Amendment itself and its subsequent treatment by the Irish
courts. This section also examines the role of two international
tribunals, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), in resolving conflicts stemming
from Ireland's strict abortion law.
Section III looks at the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Irish Constitution.
Those two amendments respectively created a right to travel
abroad to obtain an abortion and a qualified right to receive
information relating to abortion services available abroad.
Section IV discusses the 1995 Act, which defines and limits the
right identified in the Fourteenth Amendment, and focuses on the
Supreme Court's decision upholding the 1995 Act.
Finally,
Section V identifies several issues left unresolved by the 1995 Act
that are likely to be the source of controversy in the future.

II. THE RIGHT TO LIFE UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

A. The Road to the EighthAmendment
The Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861 (hereinafter Act
of 1861) has long provided that anyone who obtains an abortion
4
in Ireland is guilty of a felony and liable for life imprisonment.

3.
The Eighth Amendment, which was incorporated at Article 40.3.3,
provides: "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect.
and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right." IR.
CONST. art. 40.3.3.
4.
Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, § 59
(Eng.). This Act was incorporated into Irish law because Ireland at that time was
ruled by England. See John A. Quinlan, The Right to Lffe of the Unborn-An
Assessment of the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L. Rav.
371, 372-73; see also, Jeffrey A. Weinstein, Comment, "An IrishSolution to an Irish
Problem": Ireland's Struggle with Abortion Law, 10 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165,
170 (1993); Angela Thompson, International Protection of Women's Rights: An
Analysis of Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre v.
Ireland, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 371, 373-74 (1994). See Weinstein, supra, at 169.

Until the early nineteenth century, it was a misdemeanor under British law for
any citizen to obtain or administer an abortion. Id. See Cathleen M. Colvin,
Comment, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan:
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As early as the 1930s, however, Irish pro-life activists began to

worry that the Act of 1861 insufficiently protected the unborn
child. As other western nations liberalized their abortion laws,
Irish pro-life activists became increasingly convinced of the need
for a constitutional amendment memorializing the right to life as
a way of preventing similar developments within Ireland.
The English Supreme Court's 1939 decision in Rex v. Bourne
fueled fears that the Act of 1861 was an insufficient protection for
the unborn.5 In Boume, the Court held that a physician who had
performed an abortion was not liable under the Act of 1861 where
the abortion was necessary to keep the woman from becoming a
"physical or mental wreck." 6 While the Court's ruling was not
binding on Irish courts, it gave pro-life activists cause for worry
because Irish courts often follow English courts, and the English
Supreme Court was interpreting
a statute that was identical to
7
one on the Irish books.
Pro-life activists were also bothered by Bourne because any
liberalization of Britain's law regarding abortion would mean that
Irish women could more easily obtain an abortion outside of

Irish Abortion Law and the Free Movement of Services in the European Community,

15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 476, 491 (1992). In 1803, the British Parliament upgraded
the crime substantially by passing an act that imposed the death penalty upon
anyone who facilitated or procured an abortion. 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58 (1803) (Eng.),
See Weinstein. supra, at 169-70; see also, Colvin, supra, at 491. British law
shifted yet again with the passage of the Offenses Against the Person Act which,
besides providing that anyone who obtains or administers an abortion Is guilty of
a felony and liable for life imprisonment, stipulates that anyone who supplies an
abortifacient would be guilty of a misdemeanor and liable for up to three years in
prison. Offen[cles Against the Person Act, supra, at 9 59. The state of British law
regarding abortion remained essentially unchanged for the remaining sixty years
of British control over Ireland. When independence finally came in 1921, Ireland
found Itself grappling with the task of having to create a constitution. Although
abortion would eventually become the subject of national debate, the original
Constitution of 1922 (Saorstdt tireann) and its twenty-seven amendments did not
address the issue. See Quinlan, supra,at 373; see also Weinstein, supra, at 17071. The Constitution of 1937 also failed to deal directly with the abortion issue.
See Quinlan, supra, at 373-74; see also Weinstein, supra, at 171. However, it

contained a provision stipulating that all laws previously in effect, and not
inconsistent with the new Constitution, would continue to be in full force unless
they were amended by the Irish legislature. See Quinlan, supra, at 373. Thus,

the abortion provisions of the Offenses Against the Person Act were carried over
under the Constitution of 1937. Id. at 373-74. See also, Thompson, supra at 373
n.7; Weinstein, supra, at 171.
5.
Rex v. Boume, 1 K.B. 687 (Eng. 1939). See Paul Ward, X+Y=?I, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 385, 387-388 (1995); see also, Quinlan, supra note 4, at
374-76; Weinstein, supranote 4, at 171.
6.
Bourne, 1 K.B. at 694. In so ruling, the Court found innocent a doctor
who had performed an abortion on a fourteen year old rape victim under the
Offenses Against the Person Act. Id. at 695-96.
7.
Quinlan, supra note 4,at 375-77.
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Ireland. 8 During the 1920s and 30s, Irish women traveled to
England in considerable numbers to have backstreet abortions,
which were more widely available there than in Ireland. 9 After
Boume, there was every reason to think that Irish women would
travel to England in greater numbers to terminate unwanted
pregnancies.1°
If Irish pro-life activists were disturbed by the English
Supreme Court's ruling in Boume, they were particularly
concerned'" by the passage of England's Abortion Act of 1967.12
This act provides, among other things, that a woman can lawfully

terminate her pregnancy during the first twelve weeks after
conception if at least two "registered medical practitioners" find
Specifically, the
that an abortion would be appropriate. 13
practitioners must find either 1) "that the continuance of the

pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or
of injury to the physical or mental health of the woman . . .
greater than if the pregnancy were terminated;" or 2) that there is
a substantial risk that the child would be born with "serious

physical or mental abnormalities." 14

Irish pro-life activists grew

increasingly concerned as most European countries during the
in enacting laws which at
1970s and 1980s followed England
15
least partially legalized abortion.
However instrumental foreign events may have been in
shaping the fear among Irish pro-life activists that Ireland might

8.
Id. at 376-77.
9.
Alexis Guilbride, A Woman's Crime, IR. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at 10,
availableIn LEXIS, World Library, Itimes File.
Id. In fact, the number of women traveling abroad initially decreased
10.
after Bourne due to the passage of the Emergency Powers Act during World War
II, which generally restricted the international travel of Irish citizens. However,
once the Emergency Powers Act was repealed, Irish women flocked to England in
increasing numbers to terminate their unwanted pregnancies. Id.
11.
See Weinstein, supra note 4, at 171; see also, Quinlan, supra note 4, at
375-77; Glenn Frankel, Abortion Issue Divides Ireland, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1990,
at A18 (stating that anti-abortion groups "grew alarmed after Britain eased its
abortion restrictions in 1967"). This alarm was apparently well-founded, for the
number of Irish women traveling abroad to obtain an abortion jumped from fewer
than 100 in 1968 to almost 4000 in 1981. Quinlan, supra note 4, at 377 n.32
(citing MEDICO-SOCIAL RESEARCH BOARD, TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY, ENGLAND
1983, WOMEN FROM THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 9 (1984)).
12.
Abortion Act, 1967, ch.87 (Eng.).
13.
Id. at § 1(I} (a)-(b).
14.
Id.
15.
Colvin, supra note 4, at 493-94; see Weinstein, supra note 4, at 171;
see Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 10-62 & app. A-B
(1987); Vicky Randall, The Politics of Abortion In Ireland, n The New Politics of
Abortion 67, 69-70 (Joni Lovenduski & Joyce Outshoorn eds. 1986); CHRISTOPHER
TIETZE & STANLEY K. HENSHAW, INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD REvmW 11-28 (6th ed.
1986).
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liberalize its abortion laws, activity on the home front ultimately
They were
proved most disturbing to the pro-life activists.
concerned by the Irish Supreme Court's new willingness to strike
down certain laws on the grounds that they violated the right to
privacy. 16 The Court stated that such a right emanated from
Article 40.3.117 of the Irish Constitution or, in the alternative,
18
from the general nature of the Irish government and society.
The Supreme Court's willingness to recognize a right to
privacy began in 1963 with its decision in Ryan v. Attorney
General.19 Ryan involved a suit to enjoin the government from
putting fluoride in drinking water, on the ground that such
conduct violated the right to "bodily integrity." In upholding the
injunction granted by the High Court, the Supreme Court first
quoted the language of the High Court's opinion: "[T]he personal
rights which may be involved to invalidate legislation are not
confined to those specified in Article 40[,] but include all those
rights which result from the Christian and democratic nature of
the state."20 The Court then held2that
the right to bodily integrity
1
was included among these rights.
The Supreme Court's 1974 decision in McGee v. Attorney
General2 2 magnified fears that the right to privacy might be used

to strike down the Act of 1861 and related anti-abortion
legislation.2 3 In McGee, a woman who was prosecuted under an
act making it illegal to import contraceptive jelly (even under the
advice of a physician) sought a declaration that the law violated

16.
Pro-life activists were also concerned that violations of the Offenses
Against the Person Act not prosecuted more vigorously. See Quinlan, supra note
4. at 374 (citing P. JAcKSON, THE DEADLY SOLUTION TO AN IRISH PROBLEMBAcKSTREET ABORTION 2 (the Women's Right to Choose Campaign 1983) (stating
that there were 58 illegal abortion cases investigated or tried between 1926 and
1974)).
17.
Article 40.3.1 provides: "The State guarantees in its laws to respect
and as far as practicable defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen."
IR. CONST. art. 40.3.1.

18.
The Court has not always been clear about the source of rights that
are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. At times, the Court has held
that a right must be, in fact, specifically enumerated. At other times, the Court
has held that such rights derive from the nature of Irish government and society.
See BRIAN DOOLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN IRELAND 156

(1994). For a discussion of the Court's willingness to recognize unenumerated
personal rights, see tnfra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
19.
[ 19651 I.R. 294 (Ir. S.C.); see Quinlan, supra note 4, at 378.
20.
[1965] I.R. at 312.
21.
Id- at 295.
22.
[1974] I.R. 284 (Ir. S.C.).
23.
See JAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw IN IRELAND 320 (1992); see also
Ward, supra note 5, at 389-90; Thompson, supra note 4, at 374.
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the right to marital privacy. 24 In ruling for the woman, a majority
of the Court found that there was in fact a right to marital privacy
deriving from Article 40.3.1 of the Constitution. 25 The Court then
held that the right to marital privacy extended to cover 26the
importation of contraceptive jelly on the advice of a physician.
Among the Irish Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence, the
McGee decision proved especially disturbing to pro-life activists
because of the Court's express reliance on two U.S. Supreme
Court decisions regarding the right to privacy,2 7 Griswold v.
Connecticut28 and Elsenstadt v. Baird.2 9

This concern derived

from the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had recently relied on
Griswold and Eisenstadt to strike down a state law restricting
30
abortion in Roe v. Wade.
Many in Ireland feared a similar
31
Ireland.
development in
Even if Irish pro-life activists had reason to believe that the
Irish Supreme Court would not extend the right to privacy to
include the right to obtain an abortion, they did not rest
comfortably. Since the enactment in 1953 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 3 2 to
which Ireland is a signatory, Irish pro-life activists had feared
that Ireland might be obligated to change its laws regarding
abortion.
Article Eight 33 of the Convention explicitly
24.
Id. Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, No. 6 (1935)
provides: "It shall not be lawful for any person to sell, expose, offer, advertise, or
keep for sale or to import or attempt to import into SaorstAt tireann for sale any
contraceptive." Id. at 285-86.
25.
McGee, [19741 I.R. at 284-285.
26.
Id.
27.
CASEY. supra note 22, at 320.
28.
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding invalid a state statute denying married
persons access to contraceptives).

29.
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding invalid a state statute prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons). Traditionally, Irish courts
have looked upon the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court "with the greatest of
respect." O'Brien v. Stoutt, [1982] I.L.R.M 327 (Ir. H. Ct); see Quinlan, supra note
4, at 380; Thompson, supra note 4, at 374 n.12; William Binchy, The Need for a
ConstitutionalAmendment, in ABORTION & LAW 116, 121 n.16 (Austin Flannery ed.,
1983).
30.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
In Roe, the Court established a trimester
framework regulating abortion. In the first trimester, the state cannot infringe
upon a woman's right to choose whether or not to have an abortion in any
manner. In the second trimester, the state may interfere only where it is
necessary to protect the woman's health. In the third trimester, the state may
regulate abortion to the point of completely outlawing it. Id. at 164-65.
31.
See CASEY, supra note 23, at 320; see also Quinlan, supra note 4, at
380 and Thompson, supra note 4. at 374 n.12.
32.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention on Human
Rights].
33.
Id. at art. 8. See Infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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acknowledges the right to privacy. 34 This concern persisted even
though the Irish legislature had not 35 (and has not) incorporated

domestic law as required by Article 29.636 of
the Convention into
37

the Constitution.
In addition, beginning in 1972, when Ireland joined the

European Economic Community (EEC), pro-life activists worried
that domestic restrictions on abortion might be construed by the
ECJ as an impermissible restriction on a service in contravention
of Article 59 of the Treaty 8 that established the EEC. 39 Ireland's

membership in the European Community was particularly
nettlesome to anti-abortionists since, unlike the Convention on
Human Rights, the EEC Treaty is "self-executing in that it
automatically becomes the law within a member state once it has
been ratified."40 Given these external and internal influences in
Ireland, pro-life activists would soon seek an amendment
to the
41
Irish Constitution that would prohibit abortion.

34.
Quinlan, supra note 4. at 382.
35.
See Infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
36.
Article 29.6 provides: "No international agreement shall be part of the
domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas." IR.
CONsT. art. 29.6.

37.
Quinlan, supra note 4, at 382-83. Because the Legislature has not
incorporated the Convention into Irish law, Irish courts have often indicated that
they are not bound by the Agreement. See infra note 171. Nevertheless, if the
ECHR identified a right to an abortion in the Convention, Ireland would almost
certainly change its strict abortion law to comport with the Court's decision. See
Infra note 172.
38.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25,

1957, 298 U.N.T.S 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
39.
See Infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
40.
Seth S. Stoffregen, Comment, Abortion and the Freedom to Travel in the
European Economic Community: A Perspective on Attorney General v. X, 28 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 543. 547 (1993). In this regard, Ireland amended Article 29.6 of the
Irish Constitution to provide that community law would automatically become
part of Irish domestic law so that Ireland could be admitted to the EEC. Id.
Article 29.3.4 now provides: "No provision of the Constitution invalidates laws
enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the
obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts
done or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from
having the full force of law in the State." IR.CONST. art. 29.3.4.
41.
In 1979, the Irish legislature passed the Health (Family Planning) Act
which authorized the sale of certain types of contraceptives, but only where the
purchaser had obtained a prescription from a doctor. See Weinstein, supra note
4, at 172 n.53 referring to Health (Family Planning) Act of 1979, no. 20 (1979) (Ir.).
Section 10 of the Act provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
authorizing (a)the procuring of abortion, (b) the doing of any other thing the doing
of which is prohibited by Section 58 or 59 of the Offenses Against the Person Act,
1861 . . . or the sale, importation into the state, manufacture, advertising or
display of abortifacients." Id. Though the act reaffirmed the Offenses Against the
Person Act, pro-life activists remained convinced that stronger protection of the
right to life of the unborn was needed. See Id. at 172-73.
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B. The EighthAmendment
The political battle for a constitutional amendment that
would explicitly recognize the right to life of the unborn began on
April 28, 1981, with the formation of the Pro Life Amendment
An umbrella organization composed of
Campaign (PLAC).42
thirteen smaller groups, 4 3 each dedicated to preventing the
legalization of abortion in Ireland, 44 the PLAC made the abortion
issue a central feature in each of the three national elections
during the years 1981-83. 45 Hesitant to be seen as endorsing a
"culture of death" 46 by an electorate composed almost entirely of
Roman Catholics, each of the major political parties announced
support for an amendment which would recognize the right to life
of the unborn during these close elections. 47 After much political
wrangling over the appropriate wording, the Irish legislature
submitted a bill containing the actual language of the Eighth
Amendment for a referendum of the people. 48 On September 7,
1983, "in one of the smallest voter turnouts in history,"4 9 the
electorate voted nearly50 two-to-one to include the amendment in
the Irish Constitution.
The Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, which is
incorporated at Article 40.3.3 provides, "[T]he State acknowledges
the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the life of
the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right."'-5 On

its face, the amendment does not recognize an absolute right to
life of the fetus. Rather, it requires that such a right be balanced
against the right to life of the mother. Moreover, the amendment

42.
See Colvin, supra note 4, at 496; see also, Weinstein, supra note 4, at
172.
43.
Colvin, supra note 4, at 495-96 n.119. Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children ISPUCI, an organization which would feature prominently in
subsequent litigation involving the Eighth Amendment, was among the most
radical of the groups.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 496.
46.
"Culture of Death" is an appellation given to the Abortion Information
Act of 1995 (discussed Infra) by the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Desmond Connell.
See Owen Bowcott, Irlsh Bishop Attacks Abortion Compromtse, GUARDIAN, June 5,
1995, at 5.
47.
Colvin, supra note 4, at 496.
48.
Under Article 46.2 of the Irish Constitution, an amendment begins as a
bill in the Ddil (house of representatives) and must be passed by both houses of

the legislature before being submitted by referendum to the people. IR.CONST.
art. 46.2.
49.
Quinlan. supra note 4, at 390.
Id.; see also Weinstein, supra note 4, at 173.
50.
51.

IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
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suggests that where it would be impracticable to protect the right
to life of the fetus, the state should not undertake to do so.
C. Treatment of the EighthAmendment by the Courts
While many Irish citizens hoped for legislation that would
delineate the scope of the right to life, it ultimately fell to the Irish
courts to interpret the new amendment. Until the enactment of
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in December of
1992, these courts consistently held that abortion was illegal
except where the pregnancy posed a direct threat to the life of the
mother. 5 2 They also held that dissemination of information
related to abortion services abroad violates the Eighth
Amendment. 53 In so ruling, the courts explicitly or implicitly
found that the unenumerated right to privacy and any right to
give or receive information, which might be ancillary to the right
to freedom of expression under Article 40.6.1 of the
Constitution,5 4 must be subordinated to the right to life of the
unborn. 5 5 The courts also found that the right to travel abroad,
which the Irish Supreme Court had recently acknowledged as an
unenumerated constitutional right,5 6 could not be invoked where
57
the purpose of traveling was to have an abortion.
Several cases regarding the freedom of expression and the
right to travel were appealed to the ECJ and the ECHR. As
explained below, however, these international tribunals often were
reluctant to overturn the findings of the Irish courts. Moreover,
52.
53.

See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
See Infra notes 65 and 92 and accompanying text.

54.

Article 40.6 provides:

The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights
subject to public order and morality:
i.
The right of citizens to express freely their convictions and
opinions.
The education of public opinion being, however, a matter of
such grave import to the common good, the State shall endeavor to ensure
that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the press, the cinema,
while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including criticism of
Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or

morality or the authority of the State.
The publication or utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or
indecent matter is an offence which shall be punishable in accordance
with law.
IR. CONST. art. 40.6.1.
55.
See infra notes 65 and 92 and accompanying text.
56.
The right to travel freely was first identified in State (K.M.) v. Minister
for Foreign Affairs, [19791 I.R. 73, 80-81 (Ir. H. Ct. 1979). See infra note 108 and
accompanying text.
57.
See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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while the ECJ and the ECHR did render decisions contrary to
Irish common law, meaningful relief for the aggrieved party was
not always immediately forthcoming.
1. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v.
Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Wellwoman Centre Ltd.
The first legal challenge to the Eighth Amendment 58 came in
Soclety for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland)Ltd. v. Open
Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd. 5 9 In this
case, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC), a
grass roots organization dedicated to safeguarding the right to life
of the unborn, sought an injunction6 ° against two Irish women's
health clinics that provided non-directive counselling regarding
abortion. 6 1 The SPUC sought to prevent the clinics from directing

patients, who had decided to obtain an abortion, to hospitals in

Great Britain that provided abortions. 6 2 While it was clear that
the clinics neither encouraged nor discouraged abortion, the High
Court issued an injunction on the grounds that the clinics'
activities violated the Eighth Amendment. 63
In issuing the
injunction, the High Court summarily dismissed the clinics'
claims that the counselling they provided was protected by the
rights of free expression and privacy. 64 Judge Hamilton, writing
for the Court, stated that "the qualified right to privacy [and] the
rights of association and freedom of expression . . . cannot be
invoked to interfere with such a fundamental right as the right to
65
life of the unborn."
On appeal, the Irish Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
without explaining why the defendants' freedom of expression and
66
privacy rights were inferior to the right to life of the unborn.
Chief Justice Finlay, speaking for the court, stated in conclusory
terms, "I am satisfied that no right could constitutionally arise to

58.
Weinstein, supra note 4, at 174.
59.
[1988] I.R. 593 (Ir. H. Ct.).
60.
"The case was later converted to an action by the Attorney General on
behalf of the interest group. This was done presumably to circumvent any
objection to the interest group's standing to bring this action." Thompson. supra
note 4, at 380 n.50.

61.
In the context of abortion. "non-directive" counselling refers to
counselling that makes a woman aware of all her options concerning her

pregnancy but does not endorse a particular option. See Open Door v. Ireland,
246 Eur.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1992); see also Thompson, supranote 4, at 381.
[19881 I.R. at 593.
Id. at 617.
Id. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 382.
[1988] I.R. at 617.
Id. at 624.
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obtain information the purpose ... of which was to defeat the
67
constitutional right to life of the unborn child."
The judgment of the Supreme Court ended the clinics' hopes
that the Irish courts would find that the rights to free expression
and privacy trump the right to life of the unborn. Undaunted, the
clinics appealed the decision of the Irish Supreme Court to the
European Commission on Human Rights 6 8 on the grounds that
the injunction violated provisions in the European Convention on
Human Rights protecting freedom of expression (Article 10), 6 9 the
right to privacy (Article 8),70 and the right to Equal Protection of
71
the laws (Article 14).

67.
Id. at 625.
68.
Open Door Counselling Ltd. v. Ireland, Apps. Nos. 14234/88 &
14235/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 131 (1991) (Commission report). Article 26 of the
Convention of Human Rights provides: "The Commission may only deal with the
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted... and within a period
of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken." Convention
on Human Rights, supra note 32, 213 U.N.T.S. at 238.
69.
Article 10 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing
of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 32, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
70.
Article 8 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as in accordance with the law and Is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
Id.

71.

Article 14 provides:

The enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
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The Commission ultimately decided the case solely on free
expression grounds. 72 Having established that the injunction
issued against the clinics actually interfered with the clinics' right

to free expression,7 3

the Commission

asked

whether

the

75
74
interference was "prescribed by law" as required by Article 10.
Under clear precedent, a restraint is "prescribed by law" if it is
adequately accessible and reasonably foreseeable. 7 6
The
Commission concluded that the clinics could not have foreseen
that Irish law prohibited their actions. 7 7 Accordingly, it held that
the injunction was not "prescribed by law" and therefore violated
Article 10.78 The Commission then referred the matter to the
ECHR. 79

The ECHR found that the injunction against the clinics
violated Article 10 of the Convention, but for different reasons
than the Commission had articulated. 80 In that regard, the Court
found that the injunction was prescribed by law, but concluded

that the restriction on the dissemination of information was "'over
broad and disproportionate' in relation to its purpose of protecting
morals."8 1 The Court deemed the restriction to be overbroad
because it proposed a "'perpetual' restraint on the provision of
[such] information . . .regardless of [a woman's] age or state of
health or... reasons for seeking counselling on the termination
82
of pregnancy."

Id. at 232. The clinics claimed that the injunction "discriminated against women
since men were not denied information 'critical to their reproductive and health
choices'." Open Door v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1992).
72.
Thompson, supra note 4. at 383. Because the injunction violated the
right to free expression, the Commission did not find it necessary to reach the
privacy issue, though it stated in dicta that the clinics themselves had not
demonstrated that they had a protectable private life within the meaning of Article
8. Open Door Counselling, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 140 (Commission report). The
Commission also indicated that the clinics had not made out a claim on equal
protection grounds. Id.
73.
Open Door Counselling, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 136 (Commission report).
74.
Id. at 135-37.
75.
See supra note 68.
76.
See, e.g., Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 271
(1979). The purpose of this rule is "to enable individuals to regulate their conduct
in the light of the foreseeable consequences of a given action." Open Door
Counselling, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 136 (Commission report).

77.

Open Door Counselling, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 137 (Commission report).

78.
Id. at 137-38.
79.
Under the Convention, human rights claims may only be considered by
the Court after the Commission has "acknowledged the failure of efforts for a
friendly settlement." Convention on Human Rights, supra note 32, 213 U.N.T.S. at
243. Traditionally, the Court has deferred to the decisions of the Commission.
Thompson, supranote 4, at 386.
80.
Open Door v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) at 32 (1992).
81.
Id. at 30.
82.
Id.
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Because the ECHR found that the restriction on the
dissemination of information violated Article 10 of the
Convention, it did not decide whether a right to abortion is
guaranteed under Article 8 or Article 14.83 The Court has yet to
84
revisit these issues.
2. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v.
Grogan

Within a year of the Irish Supreme Court's initial ruling in
Open Door Counselling, upholding the injunction granted by the

High Court, the Irish courts encountered another case involving
the Eighth Amendment. In Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children v. Grogan,8 5, the SPUC sought to enjoin three student
organizations 6 from disseminating information about where
abortion services could be obtained abroad, arguing that such
conduct violated the right to life of the unborn as it had in Open
Door Counselling.87 The student groups defended on the ground
that under Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibit
restrictions on services provided in member states, they were
entitled to publish and distribute such information.88

83.
Id. at 28.
84.
See infra notes 170-96 and accompanying text. The ECHR holding in
Open Door Counselling generated a mixed reaction from the Irish public. Aoife
Mac Eoin. Mixed Reaction in Ireland on EuropeanAbortion Decision, UPI, Oct. 30,
1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The Court's failure to hold that
the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention includes the right to have an
abortion subdued any joy that pro-choice activists may have experienced over the
decision. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 391-92. Moreover, the Irish Supreme
Court ultimately refused to repeal the injunction because the clinics had
petitioned the Supreme Court directly to remove the injunction but the Supreme
Court can act only on appeals from the High Court. Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., [1994] 1 I.L.R.M.
256, 9 (Ir. S.C.) (page numbers refer to full-page LEXIS printouts). The Court's
refusal to overturn the injunction came after the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which established a right to disseminate information concerning
abortion. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Court
indicated in dicta that despite the "appeals" issue, the Court would not be
compelled to remove the injunction because the original case pre-dated the
Amendment. [1994] 1. I.L.R.M. at 9.
85.
[1989] I.R. 753 (Ir. H. Ct.).
86.
The student groups were the Union Students of Ireland, the Students'
Union of University College Dublin, and the Students' Union of Trinity College

Dublin. Id. at 762.
87.
[1989] I.R. at 760.
88.
Article 59 calls for the progressive abolition of "restrictions on the
supply of services within the European Economic Community." EEC TREATY art.
59. Article 60, in turn, provides that "service" for purposes of the Treaty "shall be
deemed to be services normally supplied for remuneration" and shall "include in
particular: (a) activities of an industrial character, (b) activities of a commercial
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Rather than rule on the community law issue itself, the High
Court referred the case immediately to the ECJ 8 9 pursuant to
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. 90 The High Court requested a
determination as to whether abortion was a "service" under
Article 60 of the EEC Treaty and whether Ireland might
nevertheless be able to impose restrictions on the distribution of
materials describing the availability of abortion services abroad. 9 1
The SPUC appealed to the Irish Supreme Court before the
ECJ could render an opinion. Based on its finding that the High
Court had essentially denied the injunction by referring the case
to the ECJ, 9 2 the Supreme Court accepted the appeal and held

that the students' distribution of the abortion information violated
the right to life of the unborn under Open Door Counselling.93

character, (c) artisan activities and (d) activities of the liberal professions." EEC
TREATY art. 60.

89.
Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland
Ltd. v. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. 4685, 4733, 2 CEC (CCH) 539, 576 (1991).
90.
Article 177 provides in relevant part:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary
decision concerning:
(a) the interpretation of the Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community; and
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act
of the Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where any such question is raised before a court or tribunal of one of the
Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its
judgment depends on a preliminary decision on this question, request the
Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon...
EEC TREATY art. 177.
91.
Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland
Ltd. v. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. 4685, 4740-41, 2 CEC (CCH) 536, 579-80 (1991),
availableIn LEXIS, IreInd Library, Cases File.
92.
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
[1989] I.R. 753, *5 (Ir.) available In LEXIS. Irelnd Library, Cases File. The Court
noted that "to defer ... reaching a decision on such an application for a period
which certainly equals and probably... exceeds the time necessary to bring the
action to hearing is...
to decline or refuse to make an interlocutory injunction.
Id. at *5. The Court further observed that "where the courts of a member state
decide to refer a question pursuant to Article 177 of the Treaty for a preliminary
ruling by the European Court of Justice... the question as to the stage of the
action in the member state at which that reference is made and what steps the
courts of the member states may take pending that determination is peculiarly a
matter for the national courts to be considered and decided in accordance with
national law." Id. at *8.
93.
Id. at 765. The Court rejected "the contention that the activity involved
in this case of publishing in the students' manuals the name, address and
telephone number... of abortion clinics in the United Kingdom, and distributing
such manuals in Ireland, can be distinguished from the activity condemned by
this Court in the Open Door Counselling Case." Id. at *6.
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The appeal to the Supreme Court turned out to be
unnecessary since the ECJ ultimately ruled against the student
groups. 9 4 After considering the issues referred to it by the High
Court, the ECJ held that abortion was a "service" under Article 60
of the EEC Treaty and thus was not subject to restrictions. 9 5 The
Court, however, held that the link between the activity of the
student groups and those actually providing the abortion services
was "too tenuous" for the restriction on the provision of
information to be considered a violation of Articles 59 and 60.96
The Court's decision left open the possibility that if the "providers
of information were affiliated with the providers of abortion
services" or perhaps if the intended recipients of the
information
97
were to bring suit, the restrictions might not stand.
3. Attorney General v. X
At the time of the Grogan decision, events were occurring that
would provide the back-drop for a case that would test the

bounds of the Eighth Amendment in unprecedented ways.

In

Attorney General v. X,9 8 a fourteen year old girl who had been
raped and impregnated by her friend's father fled with her
99
parents to England for the purpose of obtaining an abortion.
After the Attorney General petitioned the Court to enjoin the girl
from terminating her pregnancy, the girl returned home to argue
her case in Court. 10 0 At various points throughout her ordeal,
the girl manifested an intent to take her own life if she was not
permitted to terminate her pregnancy.' 0 1
Before the High Court, the girl argued that there was a right
to travel abroad to obtain a service lawfully available in another

94.
Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. at 4740, 2 CEC at 579.
95.
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, [1991] E.C.R. at 4739. 2
CEC (CCH) at 579.
96.
Id.
97.
Dena T. Sacco & Alexia Brown, Regulaton of Abortion In the European
Communuty-Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan,
33 HARV. INVL L.J. 291, 297 (1992). It is now unlikely that Articles 59 and 60 of
the Treaty of Rome could be used to strike down Irish laws restricting abortion.
Before signing the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Ireland insured that it contained a
provision stipulating that nothing in the treaties of the EEC would be construed
as interfering with Ireland's domestic law regarding abortion. See Infra notes 11317 and accompanying text.
98.
[1992] I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir. H. Ct.), availablein LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases
File.

99.

Id. at 2 (page numbers refer to full-page LEXIS printouts).

100.
101.

Id.
Id-at 2-3.
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state under State (KM.) v. Ministerfor ForeignAffairs, 10 2 and that
such a right must trump the right to life of the unborn. 10 3 She
also argued that the right to life of the unborn must be

subordinate to the right to life of the mother, even if the threat to

the life of the mother is self-imposed. 0 4
The High Court
nevertheless granted the injunction, finding that the right to
travel must be subordinated to the right to life of the unborn and
that the threat to the girl was of a "different order and magnitude
than the certainty that the fetus would die if an injunction were
not granted."10 5 Although the ECJ had determined that abortion
was a "service" under Article 59 of the EEC Treaty, the Court
noted that it was unlikely to interfere with the Ireland abortion
issue given its tendency to defer to member states regarding
matters of public security and public health. 10 6
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High
Court. 10 7 Four of five justices who heard the case held that
abortion is permissible if the pregnancy presents a real and
substantial threat to the mother's life.108 The same four found
that the girl's promises to take her own life, under the
circumstances, posed such a threat.1 0 9
In addition, all five
justices agreed that there is an unenumerated constitutional right
to travel. 110 However, three of the five argued that, absent a real
and substantial risk to the life of the mother, such a right would
1
be subordinated to the right to life of the unborn.' '
The holdings in X made clear that a woman was legally
permitted to obtain an abortion in Ireland only if the pregnancy
posed a substantial risk to her life. It also made clear that the
threat of suicide might constitute such a risk in the event that the
woman was forced to carry the pregnancy to term. It was
unclear, however, whether a woman's promises to kill herself
alone would amount to a "substantial risk," or whether

102.

[1979] I.R. 73 (Ir. H. Ct.). The right to travel was also upheld in Lennon

v. Ganley, [1981] I.L.R.M. 84 (r. H. Ct.) and Kane v. Governor of Mountioy Prison.
11988] I.L.R.M 724 (Ir. H. Ct.).
103. X. [19921 I.L.R.M at 5.

104.
105.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6-7.

As to the right to travel, the Court noted that:

"If a

Constitutional right is being abused by exercising it to commit a wrong (as would
be the case when traveling abroad to procure an abortion) then the court may

restrain the wrongful act even though this may involve the curtailment of the
exercise of a constitutional right." Id.
106. Id. at8.
107. [1992] I.L.R.M. 414 (r.) available In LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File.
108. Id. at 17, 37, 42 & 46 (page numbers refer to full-page LEXIS
printouts).

109.
110.
111.

Id.

Id. at 18, 31, 40,43 & 46.
Id.at19, 31& 46.
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corroborative evidence would be needed to establish such a risk.
In X, several of the opinions finding a "substantial risk" of suicide
appear to rely heavily on the report of a psychologist to the effect

that the girl was capable of suicide. 112 Nevertheless, at least one
commentator has suggested that "mere verbal threats
of suicide
13
suffice to meet the real and substantial risk test."

While all the justices on the Supreme Court recognized an
unenumerated constitutional right to travel, in the wake of X it
has appeared that a majority of the Court believed that the right
should be subordinated to the right to life of the unborn, except
where the pregnancy constituted a substantial risk to the life of
the mother. This principle effectively meant that after X, Irish
authorities could prevent a woman from going abroad to obtain
an abortion unless the pregnancy posed a substantial risk to the
life of the mother. As a result, Irish women were only permitted
to do abroad what they could do, at least in theory, in Ireland.
III. THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The disturbing factual background and ultimate disposition
of X set in motion a chain of events that would forever change the
complexion of Irish abortion law. Prior to X, Ireland had signed
the Maastricht Treaty, 14 which was designed to further develop
ties within the European Community, only after the other
members had agreed to a provision" 5 stipulating that nothing in
the Maastricht Treaty would be construed to limit the right to life
of the unborn found in the Irish Constitution." 6 Within a month
of the X decision, the Irish Prime Minister sought to have this
provision modified to incorporate the Court's holdings."17 While
the provision was never changed for fear that it might start a

112. See, e.g., Id. at 16 (opinion. J. Finley). The report stated that the girl
"was capable of... (suicide), not so much because she is depressed but because
she could calculatingly reach the conclusion that death Is the best solution."
[1992] I.L.R.M. at 3 (lr.H.Ct.).
113. Sabina Zenkich, X Marks the Spot While Casey Strikes Oub Two
ControversialAbortion Decisions, 23 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1001, 1013 (1993).
114. Treaty on European Unity and Final Act, February 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
247 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
115. The "Irish Exception" Protocol provides: "Nothing in the Treaty on
European Union, or in the Treaties establishing the European Communities, or in
the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those treaties, shall affect the
application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland." Id. at 362.
116. See Stoffregen, supra note 40, at 572-73; see also Zenkich, supra note
111, at 1009.
117. See Stoffregen, supra note 40, at 573; see also Zenkich, supra note
111, at 1007.
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domino effect which would unravel the Maastricht Treaty,
ministers from the member states met and agreed to a "solemn
declaration" that the provision would not be interpreted "to
restrict the free travel of [Irish] women" to obtain an abortion (at
18
least where the life of the mother was at stake).
More importantly, the X case made clear that a majority of
Irish citizens favored some liberalization of the country's abortion
law.
By the end of the year, three proposed amendments
regarding abortion were submitted to the people for
The first of these three, which would have
referendum.1 19
solidified the holding in X that abortion be allowed only where the
pregnancy poses a substantial risk to the life of the mother, was
resoundly defeated. 12 0 This was virtually assured by the fact that
both pro-life and pro-choice activists encouraged their
constituencies to vote against the proposal-pro-life activists
because they opposed any infringement on the right to life of the
unborn, and pro-choice activists because they believed the
12 1
proposal did not go far enough.
By contrast, the second and third proposals passed easily,
which recognized the right of a woman to travel abroad to
terminate her pregnancy and to have access to information about
the availability of abortion services abroad respectively. 12 2 On
of
December 3, 1992, they were incorporated into Article 40.3.3 123
Fourteen.
and
Thirteen
Amendments
as
Constitution
Irish
the

The Thirteenth Amendment provides that the right to life of the
unborn as protected by the Eighth Amendment "shall not limit
1 24
the freedom to travel between the state and another state."
The Fourteenth Amendment in turn provides that the Eighth
Amendment "shall not limit the freedom to obtain or make
available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be
relating to services lawfully
established by law, information
125
available in another state."

See Stoffregen, supra note 40, at 573.
118.
119.
See Jill SerJeant, Irish Voters Reject Proposal to Lfe Blanket Ban on
Abortion, Reuters North American Wire, Nov. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, US File.
120.
Id. The final tally for the proposal was 34.6% for and 65.4% against.

Id.
121.
Jill Serjeant, Ambiguous Abortion Vote Produces Bizarre Alliance.
Reuters Library Report, Nov. 24, 1992. availablein LEXIS, Neds Library, US File.
122.
Serjeant, supra note 118. 62.3% of those who voted for the proposal

regarding the right to travel (as opposed to 37.7% against) and 59.8% voted for
the proposal regarding access to information (as opposed to 40.2% against). Id.
123. Weinstein, supra note 4,at 196.
124. IR.CONST. amend. XIII (incorporated at art. 40.3.3).
125. IR. CONsT. amend. XIV (incorporated at art. 40.3.3).
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The full impact of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments will not be appreciated for some time. Nevertheless,
the enactment of the amendments had several immediate
consequences for Irish law and society. After the referendum, it
was still permissible for a woman to obtain an abortion in Ireland
if the pregnancy posed a real and substantial risk to her life
under X. But the Thirteenth Amendment appeared on its face to
guarantee that the Eighth Amendment could never again, under
any circumstances, be interpreted as prohibiting a woman from
traveling abroad to terminate her pregnancy. This marked a
radical departure from the majority view in X that travel abroad
for the purpose of obtaining an abortion would only be allowed
where the pregnancy posed a substantial risk to the life of the
mother.
The Fourteenth Amendment offered the hope that Irish
women would be able to legally obtain information about abortion
services lawfully available abroad. However, the "subject to such
conditions" language contained in the amendment left open the
possibility that legislation could all but eliminate the right to
receive information relating to abortion and reinstate an Open

Door Counselling and Grogan regime. In response, as early as five
days after the passage of the amendment, some governmental
officials called publicly
for new legislation that would protect the
26
newly created right. 1
The fact that it took until March of 1995 for such legislation
to materialize testifies to the strength of the pro-life lobby 12 7 and
to the unwillingness of most politicians to place their reputations
and their jobs on the line for such a controversial issue as
abortion. 12 8 It was only with the entrenchment of a coalition
government (consisting of members of the Labour Party, Fine
Gal, and Democratic Left) that new legislation ensuring access to
such information showed signs of becoming a reality. 129 By the

126.
Geraldine Kennedy, Abortion Issue is Heavily Defeated, IR. TIMES, Nov.
30, 1992, at 6, available in LEXIS. World Library, Itimes File (noting that as of
November 30, 1992, some members of the Labour Party were advocating that
"new abortion legislation... be referred to the Supreme Court for a test of its
constitutionality.")
127. Philippe Bernes-Lassere, L'avortement enflamme de nourveau la vie
polltque irlandaLse, [Abortion Again Inflames Irish Political Debate], AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, March 7, 1995, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Non-Eng File.
128.
Patsy McGarry, Passing of Abortion Information is Welcome Step, Says
Church Publication, IR. TIMES, March 24, 1995, at 5, available in LEXIS, World

Library, Itimes File.
129.

Id.
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middle of March, both houses of the legislature had approved a
130
bill which extends a limited right to receive such information.

IV. THE ABORTION INFORMATION ACT OF 1995
A. The Provisionsof the Act
The 1995 Act grants Irish women a qualified right to receive
information regarding to abortion services available abroad. The
1995 Act delineates how and under what circumstances
publishers of abortion material, and organizations rendering
pregnancy counselling, can disseminate information concerning
abortion. Overall, the 1995 Act reflects the belief that while Irish
women are entitled to receive information that will help them
make intelligent decisions about their pregnancies, under no
circumstance should such information be presented in a way that
advocates or encourages abortion.
Section 3 of the 1995 Act relates to the publication of
31
It
materials concerning abortion services available abroad.'
provides that it shall not be unlawful to publish, or procure the
publication of, Act information if: (1) the information relates only
to services which are lawfully available in the country in which
they are rendered; (2) the information and the manner of its
publication are in compliance with the laws of that country; (3)
the information is truthful and objective; and (4) the information
does not advocate or promote the termination of the
pregnancy. 13 2 The means of distribution of such information are
not limited in any way except that under Section 4, it is illegal to
display a public notice containing such information or to
otherwise distribute unsolicited such information concerning
l
abortion services available abroad. 33
Section 5 sets forth the responsibilities of anyone who gives
advice or provides counselling to individual members of the public
regarding pregnancy. 13 4 Under this provision, where such a
person 135 is approached by a woman (or someone acting on behalf

130. Bemes-Lassere, supra note 126. The Ddi1 passed the bill by a vote of
85 to 67 on March 10, 1995. Id. The Senate passed the bill without vote on
March 14, 1995. Chris Parkin, Irish Senate Passes Abortion Bill, UPI, Mar. 14,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
131. Abortion Information Act, supra note 1, at § 3.
132. Id.
133. IcL at§4.
134. Id. at § 5.
135. Section 5 applies to corporations and other kinds of social
organizations. "Person" for purposes of the section is defined under section 1(i)
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of the woman) seeking information concerning pregnancy, he or
she must fully inform the woman of all the courses open to her in
relation to her particular circumstances.13 6 Furthermore, the
counsellor cannot advocate or promote
the termination of the
13 7
pregnancy under any circumstances.
As an additional precaution, Section 6 attempts to eliminate
any financial incentives a person engaged in giving pregnancy
counselling might have to encourage the woman to seek an
abortion.13 8 The Section does this in part by making it illegal to

obtain "directly or indirectly any financial or other benefit from
any person who provides [abortion] services outside the state or

has an interest in the body providing such services." 13 9 The
Section also prevents the counsellor from obtaining, either
indirectly or directly, any financial benefit from the woman in
connection with obtaining information regarding abortion services
available abroad or the utilization by the woman of abortion
140
services outside the State.
Section 8 further restricts the freedom of persons who give
abortion counselling by making it unlawful for them, or their
employers or principals, to make an appointment or any other
arrangement for an abortion on behalf of a woman who has
decided to terminate her pregnancy. 14 1 The Section, however,
also stipulates that nothing in the 1995 Act should be construed
as prohibiting a counsellor from communicating with the
abortionist once the appointment has been made. 14 2 In addition,
Section 8 provides that the counsellor may give the woman any
"medical, surgical, clinical, social or other like records" which she
might need in undergoing the abortion procedure. 143 Finally,
Section 10 provides that anyone who violates any provision of the
1995 Act shall be liable for an
amount not to exceed One
1 44
Thousand Five Hundred Pounds.
The general thrust of the 1995 Act was clear from the
moment it passed the Senate: While Irish women are to be
permitted to receive information relating to abortion services
lawfully available in another country, the information cannot be

as any entity that "engages in, or holds himself, herself or Itself out as engaging
in, the activity of giving information, advice or counselling to individual members
of the public in relation to pregnancy." Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id.

137

Id.

138.
139.
140.

Id. at § 6.
Id.
Id.

141.

Id. at § 8.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at§ 10.
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presented in a way as to encourage or promote abortion. It was

decidedly less clear whether the new legislation would pass
constitutional muster in light of the Fourteenth Amendment and

the Supreme Court's recent abortion holdings in Open Door
Counselling, Grogan, and X.
In the United States, it invariably takes years for a case
testing the validity of an act of Congress to reach the Supreme
Court. But the Irish Constitution avoids this delay by allowing
the President to refer certain acts of the legislature' 45 directly to
the Supreme Court for a determination as to their
constitutionality. 14 6 Relying on this provision, on March 18,
1995, President Mary Robinson asked the Court to examine the
1995 Act for constitutional defects. 1 47 On May 12, 1995, the
Court handed down an eighty-page opinion upholding the 1995
Act.
B. The Supreme Court'sDecision in In the Matter of Abortion
InformationAct of 1995
Before the Supreme Court, counsel "for the unborn" and
counsel for the mother each made several arguments challenging
the 1995 Act. By far the most important argument advanced by
counsel for the unborn was that the 1995 Act is unconstitutional
for failing to contain a provision requiring that parents of minors
and husbands be informed when the mother seeks information
pertaining to abortion services available abroad. 148
This

145. Article 26 applies to "any Bill passed or deemed to have been passed
by both houses of the Oireachtas other than a Money Bill, or a Bill expressed to
be a Bill containing a proposal to amend the Constitution, or a Bill the time for
the consideration of which by Seanad Eirearn shall have been abridged under
Article 24 of this Constitution." IR. CONST. art. 26.
146. Article 26.1.1 states that "the President may, after consultation with
the Council of State, refer any Bill to which this Article applies to the Supreme
Court for a decision on the question as to whether such Bill or any specified
provision or provisions of such Bifi is or are repugnant to this Constitution or to
any provision thereof." IR. CONsT. art. 26.1.1.
147. IrelandMay Review Abortion Gag Rule, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), March
19, 1995, at A77, available In LEXIS, News Library, Atmsun File.
148. Counsel for the unborn also advanced a natural law argument against
the 1995 Act. In essence, counsel argued that even if the 1995 Act was valid
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be struck down as violating natural
law because the right to life is a natural right and the 1995 Act interferes with
that right. In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 81, 21
(Ir. S.C.), available In LEXIS, IreInd Library, Cases File (page numbers refer to full
page LEXIS printouts).
To most observers in the United States, the idea of making a natural law
argument before the country's highest court would seem absurd. But Ireland,
unlike the United States, historically has been subject to competing sources of
authority-positive law and natural law. In this regard, Article 41.1 of the Irish
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First, counsel

contended that under the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Article 41 of the Constitution, which generally acknowledges the

family as the fundamental unit of society, parents of minors and

husbands have a right to know when the mother Is seeking
abortion information. Having made this argument, counsel next
contended that any legislation that does not contain a provision
expressly acknowledging this right is constitutionally defective.
The Supreme Court summarily rejected the second portion of

this argument on the grounds that the legislature was entitled to
assume, under Donegal Co. Operative Livestock Mart Ltd. v.
Attorney General14 9 and related cases, 150 that the 1995 Act would
15 1
be interpreted in accordance with "constitutional justice."
However, in so holding, it seems that the Court implicitly
recognized that "constitutional justice" would require that persons
giving pregnancy counselling must inform parents of minors and
husbands, as the case may be, of the mother's decision to seek
abortion information. The Court came close to acknowledging
this idea when it stated "Constitutional justice requires that in
the giving of ... [abortion] information ... and advice regard be

Constitution provides that the "State recognizes the Family as the natural primary
and fundamental unit group of society, and as a moral institution possessing
inalienable and imprescriptible rights antecedent and superior to all positive law."
IR. CONST. art. 41.1. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's own jurisprudence
likewise has recognized that some "fundamental personal rights are not conferred
by the Constitution" but derive from natural law. William Binchy, Abortion Ruling
One of the Most SignIficantLegal Decisions Since Foundation of the State, IR. TIMES,
May 15, 1995 at 12, available in LEXIS, World Library, Itimes File. In that regard,
one might recall the Court's statement in Ryan to the effect that "personal rights.
. . are not limited to those specified in (the Constitution) but include all those
rights that flow from the Christian and Democratic nature of the state." Ryan,
[1965] I.R. at 312.
Despite the existence of authority supporting the primacy of natural law, the
Supreme Court held that for a democracy to function effectively, positive law must
trump natural law. In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act, 2 I.L.R.M. at 17.
In so ruling, the Court relied heavily on several provisions in the Constitution
such as Article 34.1, which provides that "Justice shall be administered in Courts
established by law by judges appointed in the manner provided by this
Constitution." IR.CONST. art. 34.1. It also relied on language in certain of its own
opinions stating that "the State is not internally sovereign but, in internal affairs,
subject to the Constitution which limits, confines and restricts its power." Byrne
v. Ireland, [1972] I.R. 241, 299 (Ir.); In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act,
2 I.L.R.M. at 27.
149. 11970] I.R. 317 (Ir.).
150. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Adoption (No.2) Bill, 1987, [1989] I,R.
656 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, Cases File ("[Ilt must be
presumed that all proceedings, procedures, discretions and adjudications
permitted or prescribed by the bill are intended to be conducted in accordance
with the principles of constitutional justice.....
).
151.
In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act, 2 I.L.R.M. at 28.
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had to the rights of persons
likely to be affected by such
15 2
information... and advice."
For its part, counsel for the mother attacked the
constitutionality of the 1995 Act on the ground that it
insufficiently vindicates the right to life of the mother.15 3 Section
5 of the 1995 Act on its face seems to prevent a physician or other
adviser who had formed an opinion that a pregnancy posed a real
and substantial risk to the mother, from advising the mother to
In counsel's view this provision might
have an abortion. 154
jeopardize the mother's life to the extent that patients tend to look
for advice from a physician, not merely a diagnosis. 5 5 In the
absence of a clear recommendation to abort the fetus, counsel
argued that a woman might conclude that such a step was
unnecessary and thereby put her life at risk.
In a similar vein, counsel for the mother contended that the
provision in Section 8 prohibiting physicians and other advisers

from making abortion appointments on behalf of the mother
amounts to an "unreasonable interference with the protection of
the right to life of the mother" where the pregnancy poses a risk
to the mother's life. 156 In counsel's view, the dangers lurking
behind the no-appointment-making rule are not rendered
harmless by the adjoining provision that a physician or other
adviser is permitted to communicate freely with the physician
performing the abortion procedure once the appointment is made.
Nor, it was argued, does the provision in Section 8, allowing
physicians to transfer to the woman any medical records
necessary for the procedure, adequately vindicate the right to life
157
of the mother.
The Court dismissed these arguments largely on the ground
that sufficient safeguards for a woman's life can be found in
Section 5's provisions providing that a physician or other advisor
is not precluded from giving full information about the
consequences of the pregnancy to the woman.1 5 8 In essence, the
Court concluded that, once appraised of the likely consequences
of seeing a high-risk pregnancy to term, a woman can make her

152.

Id.

153.

Id. at 25.

154.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
155. In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act, 2 I.L.R.M. at 25.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. The Court also dismissed summarily the contention that Section 7
(which prohibits physicians or any other advisor from having a direct or financial
interest in an entity which provides abortion services) is unconstitutionally vague.
The Court observed simply that Section 7 is "quite clear, so that ... [anyone
providing abortion information] would have no difficulty in understanding what it
is that the Section makes unlawful." Id. at 26.

1142

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:1117

own decision as to appropriate action and can undertake such
action without assistance. Moreover, unlike counsel for the
mother, the Court concluded that Section 8's "communication"
and "records" provisions go a long way toward vindicating the
right to life of the mother.15 9
V. IRISH ABORTION LAW AFTER IN THE MATTER OF ABORTION

INFORMATION ACT OF 1995

In the wake of Open Door Counselling, Grogan, X, and In the
Matter of the Abortion Information Act of 1995, several aspects of
Ireland's abortion law seem clear. A woman seeking to terminate
an unwanted pregnancy may obtain an abortion in Ireland only if
the pregnancy poses a substantial risk to her life. 160 Under X,
the threat of suicide in the event that the woman is forced to
carry the fetus to term may constitute a "substantial risk." 16 1 It
is not clear, however, whether a mere expression of an intent to
kill oneself would suffice or whether such threats would need to
be corroborated by the sworn statement of a psychologist or
physician.

162

Absent a "substantial risk" to her life, an Irish woman
seeking an abortion is relegated to traveling overseas to undergo
the procedure. The Thirteenth Amendment should prevent Irish
authorities from stopping a woman from leaving the country, even
if they have reason to believe that she will terminate the
63
pregnancy while abroad.1
Moreover, Irish women should find it easier to obtain
information relating to abortion services available abroad in light

159. Id. at 25-26.
160. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. One should be aware of
convoluted language in In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act to the effect
that "Itihe provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment . . . do not give a right to
abortion... where none existed prior to [its) enactment." In the Matter of the
Abortion Information Act, 2 I.L.R.M. at 24. A skillful lawyer for the right to life of
the unborn might argue in a future action that such language suggests that the
Thirteenth Amendment does not give Irish women an unqualified right to travel
abroad to obtain an abortion. Rather, it would be argued, the Amendment does
nothing more than solidify Xs holding that the right to travel only trumps the

right to life where there is a substantial risk to the right to life of the mother. In
fact, it appears from the full context of the Court's statement that the Court was
only addressing whether or not the Thirteenth Amendment created a right to
obtain an abortion in Ireland where none existed before. In the final analysis,
the right to travel abroad is fully protected even if the purpose of traveling abroad
is to obtain an abortion.
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of the holding in In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act of
1995. Under the 1995 Act, the dissemination of names and
addresses of abortion clinics and other information related to
abortion services abroad is permitted, provided that the
information is not presented in a way that promotes or
164
encourages abortion.
Though the Supreme Court's decision in In the Matter of the
Abortion InformationAct of 1995 shed light on the state of abortion
law in Ireland, several problems persist. First, it is not clear
whether the Irish Courts will require that parents of minors and

husbands be informed that the girl or woman has sought
information regarding abortion. The Supreme Court seemed to

suggest in In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act of 1995
that "constitutional justice" would require that parents and
husbands be so informed, without saying so explicitly. 165 A
requirement that the parents and husbands be told of the

pregnant mother's decision to seek abortion information might
well deter the mother from seeking such
information and thwart
166
the primary purpose of the 1995 Act.
Unfortunately, in the wake of the Irish Supreme Court's
decision upholding the 1995 Act, there is also likely to be some
confusion as to the boundary between advocacy and nonadvocacy in the context of pregnancy counselling. For example, it
is unclear to what extent a physician may be liable for advising a
patient that she is highly likely to give birth to a child with
abnormalities and also that abortion services are available

164. See supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
165.
See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
166. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this concern in PlannedParenthood
v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). In Casey the Court held that prior to fetal
viability, the state cannot place an "undue burden" on a woman's right to have an
abortion. Id. at 877. After the onset of viability, however, the state may regulate
abortion to the extent it sees fit as long as the state allows for the termination of
pregnancies that endanger a woman's life or health. Id. at 846. The U.S. Supreme
Court went on to find that a requirement that the parents of a minor be informed
of their daughter's decision to have an abortion does not place an undue burden
on the daughter's right to choose because such a requirement will allow "the
parent or parents of [the daughter] the opportunity to consult with her in private,
and to discuss the consequences of her decision in the context of the values and
moral or religious principles of their family." Id. at 899-900. The Court also held,
however, that a requirement that the father of the child be notified of the woman's
decision to have an abortion does place an undue burden on the woman's right to
choose. Id. at 893-94. In so ruling, the Court noted that "[a] state may not give to
a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their
children." Id. at 898. It also found that a notice requirement as to the father
would be especially hard on women in abusive relationships because such
women might fear that their decision to have an abortion would subject them to
physical or psychological abuse and thus decide not to seek an abortion. See Id.
at 897.
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abroad. Ordinarily, a physician might not be concerned about
such a scenario because authorities would be unlikely to gain
access to the substance of the conversation between the physician
and the patient. But under Section 9 of the 1995 Act, a district
court can authorize the seizure of certain documents in the
physician's possession if the court believes that the documents
will be relevant

in

a

prosecution

under the

1995 Act. 16 7

Therefore, physicians have every incentive to take the utmost care
to avoid advice which might be construed as improper
counselling.
As to the future of the law itself, it is unlikely that pro-choice
activists will be able to use the Irish political process to give
women a broader right to obtain an abortion in Ireland in the
forseeable future. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
relate only to a woman's right to obtain information about
abortion services available outside of Ireland and her right to
travel abroad to use such services. The amendments do not in
any way authorize legislation which will make abortions more
widely available within Ireland itself. Consequently, the only
domestic channel available to those who wish to see greater
inroads into the right to life of the unborn is another
constitutional amendment. Given the pervasive influence of the
Catholic Church, it seems unlikely that the Irish people would
vote to make abortion more widely available in Ireland,
particularly so soon after they memorialized the right to life of the
unborn under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. 168
Given the uncertainty they face at home, those who support a
woman's right to choose may look to international law for
authority favoring a woman's right to have an abortion.
Unfortunately, the treaties of the EEC are unlikely sources of
such authority. For a while, it looked as if the EEC Treaty might
offer some hope because the ECJ had determined that abortions

167.
Abortion Information Act, supra note 1, at § 9.
168. On the other hand, Ireland is undergoing a period of unprecedented
social change reminiscent of what the U.S. experienced in the 1960s and 1970s.
Perhaps most indicative of this Is the recent referendum on divorce. Since the

Constitution was enacted in 1937, Article 41.3.2 had provided that "no law shall

be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage." IR. CONST. art,
41.3.2. On November 24, 1995, the Irish people voted by a slim margin to allow
divorce in cases in which the couple has been separated for four of the previous
five years, and there is no reasonable prospect for reconciliation. See Carol
Coulter, 'No-fault' Divorce Basis Not Debated, IR. TMEs, June 21, 1996 at 14,

available in LEXIS, World Library, Itimes File. Most remarkable about this event
is the fact that the Irish people had rejected a similar challenge to Article 41.3.2
by a margin of nearly two-to-one only nine years earlier. See Easing of Irish
Divorce Laws Loses Support as Vote Nears, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 24, 1995, at A25,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Azrep File.
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were "services" for purposes of Article 60 and accordingly could
not be subject to undue restrictions.1 6 9 The Maastricht Treaty of
1992, however, which superceded the EEC Treaty, contains a

provision stipulating that nothing in the Treaty should be
construed as interfering with Ireland's domestic law regarding

abortion.'

70

By contrast, the European Convention on Human Rights
(hereinafter Convention) might still be used to force Ireland to

liberalize its abortion law. Because the legislature has never
formally incorporated the Convention into domestic law as
required by Article 29.6 of the Irish Constitution, 17 1 Irish Courts
may find that they do not have jurisdiction over matters arising
under the Convention. 17 2 But this does not necessarily mean
that an Irish woman who believes that her rights under the
Convention have been violated has no recourse, for the woman
may appeal her case to the Commission on Human Rights and
ultimately to the ECHR. A decision by the ECHR finding a right
to abortion in the Convention would almost certainly be honored
73
by Ireland. 1

169.

See supra note 94 and accompanying text.

170.
See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
171.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
The courts have refused to accept the Convention as binding authority
172.
on several occasions. See In re O'Laighlis 119601 I.R. 93, 125 (Ir.) ("ITIhis
[Supreme] Court can not give effect to the Convention if it be contrary to domestic
law or purports to grant rights or impose obligations additional to those of
domestic law."); see also Norris v. Attorney General, [1984] I.R 36, 66 ("The
As such, however, it does not and
Convention Is an international agreement ....
cannot form part of [Ireland's] domestic law, nor affect in any way questions
which arise thereunder."). This is not to say that Irish courts always ignore the
convention. "Occasionally, the Irish courts will use the jurisprudence of the
Convention to bolster their own reasoning on a matter of domestic law, and some
judges have gone so far as to suggest that there is a presumption that certain
aspects of Irish law . . . are in conformity with the requirements of the
convention." Gerard Quinn & Donncha O'Connell, Symbolic Day for European
Law Should Prompt Review of Irish Rights, IR. TIMES, June 30, 1995, at 12,
available In LEXIS. World Library, Itimes File. For a further exploration of these
issues, see Thompson, supranote 4, at 378. But cf. G.F. Whyte, The Application of
the European Convention on Human Rights Before the Irish Courts, 31 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 856, 860-61 (1982) ("[Tlhe Irish courts have, for the most part, refused to
take cognisance of the provisions of the Convention in domestic cases.").
173. Thompson, supra note 4, at 378. Article 46 of the Convention provides
that the signators to the Convention have the option to declare at any time "that
(they) recognize as compulsory pso facto and without special agreement, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all matters concerning the interpretation and
Convention." IR. CONST. art. 46. Ireland recognized the
application of the ...
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court at the same time it signed the Convention.
See Thompson, supra note 4, at 378 n.39; ANDREW Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION iN DOMESTIC LAW 170 (1983). Further, Ireland has
proved willing to modify its domestic law to make it consistent with decisions of
the ECHR. For example, in late June of 1993, the Irish legislature passed a law
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Within the Convention, the most likely source of authority for
a right to abortion is Article 8, which provides:
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.

2)

There shall be no interference by a public authority with the

exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and
is necessary in democratic society in the Interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
174
others.

While the ECHR has avoided the issue of whether the right to
abortion is encompassed within Article 8,175 it might so hold if it
were presented with an appropriate case.
Under applicable
precedent, the ECHR would first ask whether Ireland's antiabortion law "interferes" with the complainant's right to maintain
respect for her private life. 17 6 To the extent that the complainant
is a woman in need of an abortion, the ECHR would almost
17 7
certainly find this prong of the test met.
After establishing that the government in fact interfered with
the complainant's private life, the ECHR would then be likely to
ask whether or not the interference was "in accordance with the
law" and whether it had a legitimate aim. 178 The ECHR would

decriminalizing homosexual activity after the ECHR had found in Norris v. Ireland,
142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) at 1718 (1988) that laws against homosexuality violate
the right to privacy found in Article 8 of the Convention. See Marie O'Halloran,
Bill on Homosexuality Passes Second Stage, IR. TIMES, June 30, 1993 at 4,
available in LEMXS, World Library, Itimes File. Similarly, in late June of 1996, the

legislature passed a law giving fathers of children born outside marriage a say In
the child's adoption in order to make Irish adoption law consistent with the ECHR
holding in Keegan v. Ireland. 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).
174. Convention on Human Rights, supra note 32, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
175. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. By contrast, In Bruggerman
v. Germany, the Commission on Human Rights found that a woman's decision as
to whether or not to terminate her pregnancy did not fall within the scope of
Article 8. Bruggerman v. Germany, App. No. 6959/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 244,
253-54 (1977) (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
176. See, e.g., Kroon v. Netherlands 297 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 46, 56-57
(1994); Keegan, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 19-20; Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17;
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1981).
177. There can be little doubt that one's sexual practices and preferences
fall within the scope of "private life". See X and Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 6, 11 (1985) (finding that for purposes of Article 8, "private life" "covers
the physical and moral integrity of the person, including his or her sexual life');
see also Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21 (holding that homosexual activity
"concerns a most intimate aspect of private life"). Moreover, a law that limits a
woman's right to have an abortion would seem to "interfere" with her sexual
practices and preferences.
178. See, e.g., Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18; Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at

1996

IRELAND'S ABORTION INFORMATION ACT OF 1995

1147

probably find that the interference was "'in accordance with the
law', since it arises from the very existence of the impugned
legislation."1 7 9 It is unclear, however, whether the ECHR would
find that the interference has a legitimate aim. The Court has
often held that the views of domestic lawmakers concerning
public morality must be given special deference.' 8 0 It has also
noted that the "margin of appreciation" to be afforded domestic
lawmakers in matters concerning public morality depends both
upon "the nature of the aim of the restriction [and] ... the nature
of the activities involved."' 8 ' At times, the ECHR seemingly has
indicated that the "margin of appreciation" given to domestic
lawmakers will be low where the underlying interest is sexual
freedom.1 8 2 Thus, in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, the Court
struck down a law that criminalized homosexual activity, stating,
"[t]he present case concerns a most intimate aspect of private life.
Accordingly, particularly serious reasons must exist before
interferences on the part of the public authorities can be

legitimate. . . .- 183 Arguably, however, the ECHR has refused to
lower the "margin of appreciation" when the matter before the
Court concerns women's reproductive rights.' 8 4 In Open Door
Counselling, for example, the Court seemingly indicated that a
wide "margin of appreciation" must be given to domestic
lawmakers in matters concerning public morality, even where a

woman's right I8to5 control her own body is implicated. The Court
stated in dicta:

lIlt is not possible to find in the legal and social orders of the
Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals, and
the State authorities are, in principle, in a better position than the

179.
See Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18; Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 19.
180.
Such court deference is usually referred to as the "margin of
appreciation" doctrine. Cf. Keegan, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18 ("Contracting States
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation it the area of adoption."); Open Door and
Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1992) ("[Nlational
authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in matters of morals . . .");
Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21 ("[al margin of appreciation is left to [the national
authorities."); and, Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 753
(1976) ("[Tlhe Court has only to ensure that the English courts acted reasonably,
in good faith and within the limits of the margin of appreciation .. .
181.
Dudgeon, 45 Er. Ct. H.R. at 21.
182.
See, e.g., Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 19; Dudgeon, 45 Er. Ct. H.R. at
21.
183. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21.
184. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 392-405; see also Kathleen M.
McCauley, Comment, Women on the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights: Would Equal RepresentationProvide More Effective Remedies?, 13 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 151, 169 (1994) (arguing that reproductive rights would benefit from the

presence of more female members on the Court).
185.

Thompson, supra note 4. at 399.
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international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of the
requirement of morals as well as on the "necessity" of a
18 6
"restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet them.

Assuming that the ECHR finds that Ireland's abortion law does
have a "legitimate aim," it would then be likely to ask whether the
law was "necessary in a democratic society."1 8 7 Among the
factors to be considered in determining whether the interference
was "necessary in a democratic society" includes whether the
"interference in question answers a pressing social need and in
particular is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."1 8 8 As
to the first of these factors, there appears to be substantial
overlap with the requirement that the interference pursue a
"legitimate aim." In fact, the two requirements might easily be
collapsed into one. As to proportionality, it is unclear what would
suffice. Because abortion arguably implicates competing rights
(the right to privacy of the mother and the right to life of the
unborn), the Court might draw a distinction, as some nations
have, 18 9 between abortions carried out before the fetus is viable
and those performed after the fetus is viable. Such a distinction
would turn on the notion that the mother's privacy interest is
more important than the unborn child's right to life pre-viability,
while the opposite is true post-viability. Alternatively, the Court
might hold that Ireland's abortion law must take into account
factors such as the woman's age, the health of the fetus, and
whether the woman would be able to care for the child if were she
190
to carry it to term.
A woman seeking to challenge Ireland's strict abortion law
may also argue that the law violates Article 14 of the Convention
in conjunction with Article 8. Article 14 provides:
The enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as

186. Open Door and Dublin Well Women, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 29 (citations
omitted).
187. See, e.g., Kroon v. Netherlands, 297 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 46, 56-57
(1994); Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18.
188. Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18; see Olsson v. Sweden, 130 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1988).
189. In the U.S., for example, under Casey, the state may not place an
"undue burden" on a woman's right to have an abortion in the pre-viability
period. In the post-viability period, however, the state may regulate abortion to
the extent it sees fit, provided the state allows for termination of pregnancies that
endanger a woman's life or health. See supra note 165.
190. Such a decision would be consistent with the Court's finding in Open
Door Counselling that Ireland's blanket prohibition on the dissemination of
abortion information violated Article 10 of the Convention because it places a
"'perpetual' restraint on the provision of [such] information... regardless of [a
woman's] age or state of health or ... reasons for seeking counselling on the
termination of pregnancy." See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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sex, race, colour, language. religion, or other opinion, national or
social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth
191
or other status.

The provision itself has "no independent existence." 19 2 That is,
one cannot violate Article 14 taken alone. Nevertheless, Article 14
"may play an important autonomous role by complementing the
other normative provisions of the Convention."' 9 3 If one of the
rights found in the Convention is only made available to some,
rather than to all persons, then those who are discriminated
against may have a claim for violation of Article 14 taken in
conjunction with the right at issue. Article 14 only becomes
important to the extent that the domestic law touches one of the
rights protected by the Convention, but generally comports with
the provision protecting that right. 19 4 To the extent that the law
interferes with a right under one of the normative provisions,
relief will be granted on that basis rather than on the basis of a
Article 14 taken in conjunction with the normative
violation of
19 5
provision.
Under existing precedent, a woman challenging Ireland's
abortion law under Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8,
would have to show that the law treats men and women
differently and that there is no "objective and reasonable
justification" for doing so. 19 6 In essence, the woman could argue
that the law discriminates against women to the extent that it
limits women's health options in a way that it does not men.
Unfortunately, the Court may well find that the law has an
"objective and reasonable justification" since it is based on a
genuine difference between men and women (women get
pregnant, men do not) and not on a mere stereotype. 19 7 In the
end, it seems unlikely that the Court would find that Ireland's

191.
192.

Convention on Human Rights, supra note 32, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
Schmidt v. Germany, 291 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26, 32 (1994); X and

Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1985); Marckx v. Belgium, 31
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1979).

193.
194.
195.

Marckx, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15.
See Schmidt, 291 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32; Marckx, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15.
See X and Y, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14 ("lAin examination of the case

under Article 14 is not generally required when the Court finds a violation of one

of the former Articles taken alone.").
196. Cf. Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 35 (1991) (addressing different treatment of foreign and domestic
newspaper); James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 10, 39 (1985)
(addressing different treatment for taking property from nationals versus nonnationals); Marckx, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16 (addressing different treatment for
adoption based on whether the child Is legitimate or illegitimate).

197.

For example, one can imagine that the Court would be less likely to

find that a law prohibiting women from holding political office on the grounds that
women are irrational has an objective and reasonable Justification.
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abortion law violates Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article
8.
VI. CONCLUSION

At a time when most of the civilized world at some level has
recognized a woman's right to choose, Ireland's strict abortion law
stands as a symbol of a by-gone world in which the Roman
Catholic Church wielded tremendous influence over secular
government. But even in Ireland, the Church can feel Its hold
beginning to loosen. With the passage of the 1995 Act, Ireland for
the first time has recognized that Irish women should have some
control over whether or not a fetus is carried to term. Although
the 1995 Act does not change the circumstances under which a
woman may lawfully terminate her pregnancy in Ireland, It does
make it easier for a woman to obtain information about where
and how an abortion may be obtained abroad. Only time will tell
whether or not more Irish women will make the four-hour boat
ride to England to do there what Irish law still precludes,
except
19 8
where the pregnancy poses a threat to the woman's life.
Keith S. Koegler°

198.

Preliminary evidence suggests that Irish women have not traveled to

England in increased numbers since the passage of the 1995 Act.

See Peter

Allen, 4,500 Fly to UKfor Baby Ops; Irish Women Traveling to BrltalnforAbortons,
DAILY MIRROR, July 10, 1996 at 8, available In LEXIS, News Library, Mirror File.
This probably reflects the fact that much of Irish society still attaches a stigma to
having an abortion and that it may be very hard for a woman, particularly a
young woman, to travel to England undetected.
*This Article is dedicated to my late father, who burned bright, but burned too
fast.

